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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

In Re Bard IVC Filters Products
 Liability Litigation

No. MD-15-02641-PHX-DGC

DORIS JONES and ALFRED JONES, a
 married couple,

Plaintiffs,

v.

C.R. BARD, INC., a New Jersey
 corporation and BARD PERIPHERAL
 VASCULAR, an Arizona corporation,

Defendants.

**JONES PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR
 PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON
 DEFENDANTS' THIRTEENTH
 AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE**

Plaintiffs Doris Jones and Alfred Jones submit their Motion for Partial Summary Judgment along with their corresponding Statement of Facts (“SOF”), filed contemporaneously herewith. Defendants Bard Peripheral Vascular and C.R. Bard, Inc. (collectively “Bard”) have produced no evidence in the Jones’s case in support of—and, therefore, there is no genuine issue to be tried—as to Bard’s thirteenth affirmative defense of its Master Answer: that there was a substantial change in the device after leaving Bard’s possession, custody, and control that caused Plaintiff Doris Jones’s injuries. As a result, the Court should grant summary judgment as to that affirmative defense.

INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND

This case arises from injuries Plaintiffs sustained after Plaintiff Doris Jones was implanted with Bard’s Eclipse® Inferior Vena Cava Filter (the “Device”) on August 24, 2010. *See* SOF ¶ 3. Dr. Anthony Avino performed the implantation procedure at

1 Memorial Health, University Medical Center in Savannah, Georgia. *Id.* at ¶¶ 3-4. The
2 Device in question had been sold to the hospital by Bard. *Id.* at ¶ 1. Bard has admitted
3 that the implanting and explanting physicians for Doris Jones's filter were not negligent
4 and did not contribute to, and were not a factor in producing, any injuries to Doris Jones.
5 *Id.* at ¶¶ 4-10. There is no evidence that Plaintiff Doris Jones's injuries were caused by
6 abuse, misuse, abnormal use, or use of the Eclipse IVC Filter in a manner not intended by
7 Defendants. *Id.* at ¶ 11. And, there is no evidence available to any party to this action of a
8 change to condition of the subject Bard Eclipse IVC filter from the time it left the custody
9 and/or control of Bard and the time it was implanted in Plaintiff Doris Jones (and
10 presumably Dr. Avino would not implant anything other than a sterile, properly packaged
11 product). *Id.* at ¶ 12.

12 Nevertheless, as its thirteenth affirmative defenses, Bard asserts:

13 Plaintiff's claims are barred to the extent that the injuries alleged in the
14 Plaintiff's Complaint were caused by a substantial change in the product
after leaving the possession, custody, and control of Defendants.

15 *Id.* at ¶ 13. Meanwhile, in its supplemental responses to Plaintiffs' Requests for
16 Admission, Bard claimed it had "no knowledge, despite completion of all discovery in
17 this case, about what happened to the Bard filter after it left the possession, custody, and
18 control of Defendant but before implantation in Plaintiff." *Id.* at ¶ 14. Bard also admitted
19 that Dr. Avino was not negligent and did not cause any of Plaintiffs' injuries, and that
20 Plaintiff's injuries were not caused by abuse, misuse, abnormal use, or use of the Device
21 in a manner not intended by Bard. *Id.* at ¶¶ 4-7, 11.

22 Plaintiffs' counsel attempted to secure Defendants' agreement to withdraw the
23 thirteenth affirmative defense on August 22, 2017. *Id.* at ¶ 15. On August 23, Bard
24 responded:

25 Regarding Defense Number 13 (Substantial Change After Leaving Bard's
26 Possession), this is not an affirmative defense but rather is an element of the
27 plaintiffs' claims where the plaintiffs carry the burden of proof. Bard does
28 not think that the plaintiffs have met their burden on this element and
therefore reserves its right to argue as such.

1 *Id.* at ¶ 16. Having failed to obtain Bard’s agreement to withdraw this defense, Plaintiffs
 2 now move for summary judgment.

3 ARGUMENT

4 Summary judgment is appropriate when no genuine issues of material fact exist
 5 and a party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). Rule 56 is
 6 not a “disfavored procedural shortcut.” *Celotex Corp. v. Catrett*, 477 U.S. 317, 327
 7 (1986). Rather, it is an integral part of the rules designed to secure the just, speedy, and
 8 inexpensive determination of every action. *See* Fed. R. Civ. P. 1. Therefore, summary
 9 judgment is properly entered “against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to
 10 establish the existence of an element essential to that party’s case, and on which the party
 11 will bear the burden of proof at trial.” *Celotex*, 477 U.S. at 322.

12 To establish a claim for products liability under a theory of defective design under
 13 Georgia law (which the parties agree applies to this case), a plaintiff must show that she
 14 was injured by a product, that it was defective, and that the defect caused her injury. *See*
 15 *Weaver v. PACCAR, Inc.*, 52 F. Supp. 3d 1342, 1346 (S.D. Ga. 2014); *Hunt v. Harley-*
 16 *Davidson Motor Co.*, 248 S.E.2d 15, 15 (Ga.App. 1978). If the product is substantially
 17 altered—such that the ultimate failure is the result of the modification and not of the
 18 device itself—the *manufacturer* “is entitled to demonstrate” that the alteration is to blame.
 19 *Talley v. City Tank Corp.*, 279 S.E.2d 264, 269 (Ga. App. 1981). Therefore, where the
 20 manufacturer has presented evidence of a modification, the extent of the change “may be
 21 a jury question[,]” whereby the jury would assess “whether the proximate cause of the
 22 injuries sustained was the original defective design or the subsequent modification.” *Id.*

23 Here, however, Bard has not presented evidence of *any* change, let alone a
 24 substantial one. By its own admission, Bard has no evidence of any change in its Device
 25 prior to implantation. It does not claim that the Device was misused or mishandled.
 26 Instead, Bard apparently intends to argue that the Device was substantially altered at some
 27 point between the time when it was sent to the hospital and when Dr. Avino implanted it
 28 in Plaintiff—all without an iota of evidence to suggest such an alteration took place.

1 Given the complete absence of evidence that the Device was modified at all, we do not
2 reach the question in *Talley* of whether the Device's modification is substantial.

3 Put differently, because Bard has failed to introduce evidence of any modification
4 *at all*, it would be sheer and impermissible speculation for the jury to conclude that the
5 Device was substantially modified after leaving Bard's possession. Bard has made no
6 showing in support of its affirmative defense, and therefore summary judgment is
7 appropriate under *Celotex* and Rule 56.

8 CONCLUSION

9 Georgia law affords manufacturers the opportunity to argue that a substantial
10 change to their product—and not the product they designed—is to blame for a plaintiff's
11 injuries. However, as with all claims and defenses, this argument must be supported by
12 the evidence or face summary judgment under *Celotex*. Here, Bard offers no evidence in
13 support of its thirteenth affirmative defense, which claims that a substantial change
14 occurred after the Device left Bard's possession or control. Therefore, Plaintiffs
15 respectfully ask this Court to grant summary judgment as to Bard's thirteenth affirmative
16 defense.

17 RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 28th day of August 2017.

18 GALLAGHER & KENNEDY, P.A.

19 By: /s/ Paul L. Stoller

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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that on August 28, 2017, a true and correct copy of the foregoing was sent via U.S. Mail and/or Electronic Mail to:

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*Counsel for Plaintiffs will be served in accordance with the Court's Case Management Order No. 1

/s/ Deborah Yanazzo